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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CALVIN L. RAMPTON, Governor
of the State of Utah, and the STATE
OF UTAH,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
HA VEN J. BARLOW, President of
the Senate of the State of Utah, and
LORIN N. PACE, Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the State
of Utah, et. al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 11725

BRIEF OF DE-FENDANTS AND RE8PONDENTS
NATURE OF CASE
The statement of case is adequately set forth in the
appellants' brief.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellants filed suit in the District Court of the
'I'hird .Judicial District challenging the constitutionality
of Section 5 ( 1), Senate Bill 10, 38th Legislature of the
State of Utah, 53-48-5 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, known
as the Higher Education Act of 1969. Answer was duly
filPd and the matter submitted to the trial court on the
pleadings. The matter was heard before the Honorable
Merrill C. Faux, District Judge, and on the 25th day
of Jnne, 1969, judgment was entered declaring that the
challenged statute was constitutional.
1

:B,ELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Repondents submit this court should affirm the decision of the Utah District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts is adequately set forth in
appellant's brief.
ARGUMENT
I

ARTICLE VII, SECTION 10 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH PERMITS THE LEGISLATURE TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS TO STATE OFFICES WHICH IT CREATES.

The principal basis upon which the plaintiff rests his
case is Article VII, Section 10 of the Constitution of
Utah. It is the plaintiffs' claim that the provisions of
Senate Bill 10, Section 5 ( 1), passed by the 38th Legislature of the State of Utah, 53-48-5, U.C.A., 1953 (Higher
Education Act of 1969) providing for the appointment of
three resident citizens to the State Board of Higher Education by each the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, impinges upon the
Governor's executive right to appoint officers of the
state.
Insofar as the Article VII, Section 10, is pertinent
here, it provides as follows:
"The Governor shall nominate, and by and
within the consent of the senate, appoint all state
and district office's whose offices are established
by this Constitution, or which may be created by
law, and whose appointment or election is not
otherwise provided for ... "
Defendants contend that this provision requires the
2

governor to nominate and appoint state and district

officers in two situations: First, where the offices are
created by the Constitution, and second, where new offices are created by law which does not provide for their
appointment or election.
T1H· plaintiff intPq>r<:'ts this lang1rngt' to 111Pan that:

" . . . the foregoing provision was intended to
place in the governor, as chief executive officer
of the state, the power to appoint all rxecntive
officers whose election or appointment is not
otherwise provided for in the constitution."
However, the portion of the Constitutional section
involved does not support this conclusion. The section
in clPar language clearly establishes two areas wherein
the Governor is directed by the Constitution to make
appointments. Article VII Section 10. First, he:
" . . . shall nominate, and by and with the
consent of the Senate, appoint all state and district officers whose offices arP PstahlishPd hy this
Constitution, . . . "
Second, he shall appoint officers to fill offices:

" . . . which may be created by law, and
whose appointment or election is not otherwise
vrovided for." (Emphasis ours.)
The petitioner interprets the language "otht>rwise proridPrl for" to rE"fer to the Constitution. Had this been
tht> intPnt of thP framPrs of the Constitution, the provi:;ion would simply have stated that:
"The governor shall nominate, and by and
with the consent of the senate, appoint all state
and district officers whose offices are established
3

by this constitution or created by law, except
otherwise provided herein."
'
A grammatical reading of the provision also demonstrates the folly of plaintiff's strained interpretatiton.
The main clause of the sentence is:
"The governor shall nominate, and by and
with the consent of the senate, appoint all state
and district officers whose offices are established
by this constitution, ... "
This expresses a complete thought. More simplified, the
main thought could be stated as follows:
"The governor shall appoint and nominate all
state and district constitutional officers."
The second half of the sentence is a subordinate qualifying clause, which limits the main clause. The prepositional
phrase "provided for" refers back to the closest noun
in the same clause, so that the grammatical sense becomes,
and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for "by law." If the prepositional phrase "provided
for" is made to refer to the noun "constitution" which
appears in the previous main clause, violence is done to a
settled principal of English grammar which we should
assume the authors of our Consitution understood. But
as will appear, there are far more weighty considerations
which compel an unstrained interpretation of this provis10n.
The plaintiff suggests that since various provisions
of the Constitution, relating to the organization and
duties of certain officers and agencies established by the
4

constitution use the language "except as otherwise prorided by law," or its equivalent, that the language of
Article VII, Section 10 "whose appointment or election
is not otherwise provided for" was intended to mean "prorided for in the constitution." However, if an accurate
grammatical reading of the constitutional section is
made, the preposition phrase "provided for" refers to
"by law." A proper grammatical reading of the sentence
as it is written, makes this section entirely consistent in
construction and form with the neighboring sections. An
awkward and unnecessary repetition of tenns would have
resulted, i.e., " ... or which may be created by law, and
whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided
for" by law.
The appointive power of the governor is conferred in
the cases of future legislation to those instances where the
legislature has not made other provision for appointment.
The power to make appointments to· public office does
not inherently belong to the Governor, but must be derived from the Constitution or statutes implementing it.
Nor does the appointive power necessarily belong to the
executive branch of government. 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Govrrnor, Section 5, p. 935, -12 Am. Jur., Public Officers, Section 93. The Utah Constitution is not one of grant, but
one of limitation, and consequently the Legislature is not
restricted in its enactments unless the restriction is
rxpressly or by necessary implication set forth by the
Constitution itself. University of Utah v. Board of Exami·11ers, -1- lT.2d 408, 295 P.2d348 (1956).
The people of the state are the main spring of
5
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government, and it is to them that the power of selectinK
individuals for office inherently belongs. The power ot
appointment to public offices "belongs where the people
have chosen to place it by their Constitution or laws.''
42 Am. Jur., Public Officers, Section 92. See ArticlP J
Section 2, Utah Constitution: "All political power is inherent in the people; ... " The people through their Constitution may confer the power to make appointments
upon the Governor or upon other selected or designated
officers. See 67 C.J.S., Officers, Section 29, p. 157, 97
A.L.R. 2d 361. Each State Constitution is unique hecausP
the people of the various states, through their constitutions, have authorized public officers, quasi public officers or private organizations to make appointments
to public offices
This principle is so well settled that it has not ]H'Pviously been drawn into question before the Supreme
Court of our State, except in an indirect way in the case
of State ex rel Hwmmond v. Maxfield, 103 Utah 1,
132 P.2d 660 (1942) where this Court had before it a
case challenging the constitutionality of an act of the
Legislature of 1933 which created a new body or commission known as the Engineering Commission. The act
also amended some sections of the statutes of Utah relating to the State Road Commission, and provided for
the termination of the tenure in office of persons then
members of that commission. The act provided that members of the Engineering Commission " ... shall serve as
the members of the State Road Commission". The principal question on appeal was whether or not the Legis6

Jat.ure, a:-; part of the plan of reorganization, could prov:ide for the tennination of the incumhency of the occupants of tlw of fices of the
Road Commissioners
011 the appointment and qualification of members of the
newly created Engineering Commission to serve ex officio as members of the State Road Conunission. This
court sustained the validity of the Act. The following
is taken from the opinion :
"The courts are confronted with the principle
that the power to create an office being in the
Legislature, ordinarily the power to abolish it
must also reside there. At one and the same time

the courts are conf ronteid with another principle that the power to fill an office, at least if
not otherwise provided for in the act creating
the office, is executive and under a constitutional
provision such as Art. VII, Sec. 10, of onr Constitution, absent at least any contrary expression
of the legislature, such power lies with the governor . ... (Emphasis ours)."
Of particular importance in the instance case is the
language of the court to the effect that the power to fill
an office, " ... if not otherwise provided for in the act
creating the office . . . " is executive in nature, and in
the absence of contrary expression of the legislature,
such becomes the governor's prerogative. Thus the legislature clearly has the authority under the Constitution
tu appoint persons to the state offices.
As will be observed, Idaho, Montana and Colorado
have constitutional provisions which are virtually identical to Article VII, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution.
7

As will appear, the Supreme Court of each of those states
has interpreted this provision to mean that the legis.
lature can appoint officers to fill office'S which it creates.
The Supreme Court of Idaho in the case of Ingard
v. Barker, 27 Idaho 124, 147 Pac. 293, 294, 295, discussed
this provision in detail. There the Governor directed
the Secretary of State to issue commissions as members
of the State Board of Horticultural Inspection to the
plaintiff and two other individuals. The secretary of
state complied with the direction of the governor insofar
as it pertained to one of the individuals but declined to
comply with the same insofar as it pertained to the
plaintiff and another, alleging that as to them the attempted appointment was void because it was in conflict
with a state statute which provided:
"The State Board of Horticultural Inspectors
shall consist of five ( 5) members, who shall be appointed by the Governor of the state, . . . ; and
in making said appointments, the Governor shall
consider any recommendations made by the State
Horticultural Association as the proper person to
be so appointed."
The appointments of the governor were not individuals selected by the State Horticultural Association.
The plaintiff brought an original action in the Supreme Court for the purpose of securing a writ of mandate directing the defendant, as secretary of state, to
issue to him a commission as a member of the State
Board of Horticultural Inspection. One of the two questions submitted for decision was:
8

"It is competent for the legislature to provide
that the State Horticultural Association shall have
the right of authority to present or recommend
to the governor a list of the names from which he
must appoint the members of the State Board of
Horticultural Inspection?"
"Section 1, art. 2, of the Constitution, provides that:
" 'The powers of the government of this
state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial;
and one person or collection of the persons
charged with the exercise of powers properly
belong to one of these departments, shall
exercise any powers properly belonging to
either of the others, except as in this Constitution expressly directed or permitted.' "
Section 6 of article 4 provides that:
" 'The Governor shall nominate and, by
and with the consent of the Senate, appoint
all officers whose offices are established by
this Constitution, or which may be created by
law and whose appointment or election is not
otherwise proiVided for.'"
"Section 1 of article 2, and section 6 of article
4 supra, have been construed by the Supreme
Court of this state in the case of In re Inman, 8
Idaho, 398,69 Pac. 120, and in the case of Elliott v.
McCrea, 23 Idaho 524, 130 P. 785, to the effect
that the Legi'Slature may create an office or offices, which may be filled by appointment either by
the chief executive or by any person, board, corporation, or association of individuals, and that
such appointment would not be in conflict with
the Constitution or an improper exercise of power
9

properly belonging to the executive d0partment
of the state government; and as stated by
court in the case of El ._ott v. McCrea, supra, the
Constitution itself provides the method of selection of legislative, executive, and judicial officers
named in the Constitution.
"(2) The framers of the Constitution could
not foresee what offices might be created by laws
subsequently enacted, and so they provided that
such offices should be filled by the Governor
unless the appointment or
should be othPr:
wise provided for. The legislature, in enacting
the statute in question, has exercised its constitutional right in naming and designating the officer
or officers who shall make these particular appointments.
" ( 4) Primarily the rule is well settled by
numerous authorities that, in the absence' of a constitutional provision to the contrary, any one
of the three departments of government may, under the authority of the statute, appoint for any
class of office in any of the three governmental
departments. (Citing cases.)
" ( 5) A state legislative body, existing by
virtue of a constitutional provision, has power
to enact any laws that are not expressly or by
nec<:'ssary implication prohibited either by the federal Constitution or by the Constitution of the
state. (Citing cases including Kimball v. Grantsville, 19 Ut. 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L.R.A. 628.)
" ( 6) The power to create an office, unlrss
otherwise provided by the Constitution, is vested
in the legislative department of the government.
The method of filHng the office is to be be determined by the Legislature, in the absence of constitutional provision. (Citing cases.)

10

"The power of the Legislature to pass laws
regulating appointments to statutory offices is
absolute, unless re1 !trained by some constitutional
provision. (Citing
.. )
"Section 6 of article 4 of the Constitution provides:
" 'The Governor shall nominate and, by
and with the consent of the Senate, appoint all
officers whose offices are established by this
Constitution, or which may be created by law
and whose appointment or election 1s not
otherwise provided for.'
"Under this constitutional provision, the
Legislature has the power to create an office and
provide for the fillling of the same whenever such
office is not established by the Constitution, and
to provide for the appointment of such officer
either by the chief executive or in any manner
that in ths wisdom of the legislature: it may deem
proper; there being no inhibition in the Constitution as to the creation of other offices than those
named therein, but, on the contrary, there being
an express recognition of such power in the following terms: 'Or which may be created by law,
and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for.' Many officers in this state
have been created by law that were not provided
for in the Constitution, and in numerous instances
the manner of their appointment has been clearly
provided for by law. The chief executive in certain instances has been given the absolute power
to nominate and appoint persons to fill certain
offices created by the Legislature. This however,
is not true in all cases. In some instances it requires the concurrence of certain state officials,
whose offices are provided for by the Constitu11

ti.on, in order to make appointments by the Gov.
ernor legal, in others the concurrence of the Senate, and in still others, the concurrence of a majority of certain boards.
"(7) That the Legislature may limit the
power of the chief executive in the matter of making appointments cannot be successfully refuted."
(Citing case.)
" ( 8) We have therefore reached the conclusion that section 1310, Rev. Codes, as amended
supra, is constitutional and not in violation of'
section 1, art. 2, and section 6, art. 4 of the Constitution of this state, and that it was clearly within
the power of the Legislature to enact said statutory provision."
In the earlier case of Elliott v. McCrea, 23 Idaho
524, 130 P. 785, 786 (1913), the constitutionality of an
Idaho House Bill was challenged because it provided for
the appointment of drainage commissioners for the disrict by the judge of the district court of the judicial district in which the drainage district was located. The following is taken from the Court's opinion sustaining the
constitutionality of the bill:

"Again, the Constitution (section 6, art. 4),
provides that the Governor 'shall nominate and,
by and with the consent of the Senate, appoint
all officers whose offices are established hy this
Constitution, or which may be created by law and
whose appointment or election is not otherwisr
provided for.' The Constitution itself provides
the method of selection of the legislative, executive, and judicial officers named in the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution, however,
could not foresee what offices might 'be created Ly
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law' subsequently enacted, and so they provided
that such offices should be filled by the Governor,
unless the appointment or election should be
'otherwise provided for.' The Legislature in this
case has 'otherwise provided.' They have clearly
exercised their constitutional right in naming and
designating the person or officer who shall make
these particular appointments. This question has
received frequent consideration by the courts, and
they have almost invariably reached the conclusions we have indicated. (Citing cases.)"
The same result was reached in the case of J,n re Inman, 8 Idaho 398, 69 P. 120, where the Medical Bill of
1899 was challenged as being unconstitutional that it contravened Section 1, Article 2 of the Constitution:
"The powers of the government of this state
are divided into three distinct departments, the
legislative, executive, and judicial, and no person,
or collection of persons, charged with the exercise
of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly
belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted."
Section 6, of Article 4 of the Idaho Constitution,
states:
"The governor shall nominate and by and
with the consent of the senate, appoint all officers
whose offices are established by this constitution,
or which may be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided
for."
Petitioner claimed that since the Medical Act authorized the Governor to name and appoint the State Board
of Medical Examiners, without the assent and concur-
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rence of the senate, the same was in violation of the constitutional sections quoted.
The Court said:
"The act in question does not contravene either
of said provisions of the constitution. Sec. 6, Art.
4, supra, points out the manner of filling offices
whose appointment or election is not otherwise
provided for by law. But in the act in question
the legislature has provided, as it has power to
do under the constitution, for the appointment bv
the governor."
·
See also Smylie v. Williams, 81 Idaho 335, 341 P.2d
451 (1959).
It is to be noted that the language of section 6 of

Article 4 of the Idaho Constitution which is given interpretation is identical to Section 10, Article VII of the
Utah Constitution.
The Montana Constitution, Article VII, Section 7, is
identical to Article VII, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution. The Montana provision states:
"The governor shall nominate, and by and
with the consent of the Senate, appoint all officers
whose offices are established by this constitution,
or which may be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided
for . . . . "
The Supreme Court of Montana in the case of In re
Terrett, 34 Mont. 325, 333, 86 P. 266, 267, had before
it an act of the 1903 Montana legislature which imposed
upon the district judges the duty of appointing persons
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to select bounty inspectors. Although the court held
that the petitioner could not challenge this appointment
in his case, it made this pertinent observation:
"However, under ·section 7, art. 7 of the constitution, the power to appoint or delegate the
appointing power is reserved to the people, acting
through the Legislature, in every instance, except
in those enumerated in the Constitution. The appointment of these persons to select the bounty
inspector could properly be delegated by the Legislature, as they are offices whose appointment is
not otherwise provided for in the Constitution
itself."
The Colorado Constitution was adopted in 1876, twenty
years before Utah became a state, and probably served
as a model for our Constitution.

In the early case of People v. Osborne, 7 Colo. 605,
4 P. 1074 (1884), the Supreme Court of Colorado had
before it an 1881 Act of the legislature which created a
State Industrial School, the supervision of which was
placed in the Board of Control who was to be appointed
by the governor. Article 14, Section 6 of the Colorado
Constitution states:
"The governor shall nominate, by and with
the consent of the senate, appoint all officers
whose offices are established by this constitution,
or which may be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided
for, . . . If, during the recess of the senate, a
vacancy occurs in any such office, the governor
shall appoint some fit person to discharge the
duties thereof until the next meeting of the senate.

"
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The Court said:
"A comparison of the foregoing provisions
of the constitution with those of section 2, supra
of the statute shows that, while an officer appoint'.
ed to fill a vacancy by virtue of the provisions
of the statute holds the office for the unexpired
term of his predecessor, one appointed under the
provisions of the constitution holds only until the
next meeting of the senate."

"It is evident, then, that if the offices in ques-

tion had been created by the constitution, the
statutory provisions for the filling of vacancies
would be in conflict with the constitutional provisions on the same subject, and to the extent of
the variance, the statute would be void. But these
offices were not created by the constitution, but
by the statute; nor can it be said that the constitution has provided either for original appoint
ments to fill the offices. or for appointments to
fill vacancies in said offices, since both events are
'otherwise provided for' by the statute. This being
so, the fundamental principal obtains that the
legislature has unlimited power in regard to legislation, save only as to restrictions imposed by the
constitution. (Citing authorities.)
The same provision of the Colorado Constitution
was challenged in People ex rel. Walker v. Capp, 61 Colo.
396, 158 P. 143 (1916). The right of the legislature
to prescribe the manner and person to be appointed warden of the state reformatory was upheld in this language:
"Neither is it true, as argued, that section 6 of
article 4 of the constitution controls as to the appointment of the warden of the reformatory. rrhis
section reads :
" 'The governor shall nominate, and by
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and with the consent of the senate, appoint
all officers whose offices are established by
this and whose appointment or election is not
otherwise provided for.• • ,..,
"The appointment of the warden of the state
reformatory is otherwise provided for, and under
the decision of the appellate courts of this state,
- (Citing cases) - the statute which provides
for the manner of appointment of such officers is
controlling.

• • •

"Our constitution does not confer upon any
officer the power to appoint a warden of the reformatory, hence it rested solely with the legislature to give that right and take it away. It had
exclusive power to say who should appoint the
warden of the state reformatory and to qualify
or modify the appointing power by such limitations as it chose to impose. The legislature has
the right to change its laws. It had the same power
to prescribe the manner of appointing a warden
of the reformatory, as in the civil service law provided, that it had when it provided for the manner
of his appointment in the act creating the institution."
Under similar circumstances the Arizona Supreme
Court in Lockwood, Post Auditor v. Jordan, State .Auditor, 72 Ariz. 77, 231 P.2d 428, upheld the constitutionality
of a state statute placing the appointing power to certain
state officers with the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, with the approval
of the Senate and House. Article III of the Arizona Constitution reads as follows:
"The powers of the government of the State
of Arizona shall be divided into three separate
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d:partments, the
_exec1:tive, the jndi.
cial; and, except as provided m this Constitution
such departments shall be separate and distinct
and no one of such departments shall
the powers properly belonging to either of the
others."
(This provision is substantially the same as Article
V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.)
The Arizona court referred to and quoted from the
earlier case of Dunbar vs. Cronin, 18 Ariz. 583, 1(i-1- P.
447, 454, relating to the establishment of a state library
with a law and legislative reference bureau, and which
provided for the appointment of a Board of Curators
and a librarian. The statute designated the individual
who was to fill the position. In that case the appointive
power of the legislature was challenged as being in violation of the Arizona Constitution. The court said:
"The only instances under the Constitution
in which the power of appointment is made exclusively executive are the specific ones above enumerated, and such others may occur when an
office becomes vacant and the law or the Constitution has provided no mode for filling such vacancy. . . . "
The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the validity of
the statute in the Lockwood case in this concluding language:
"We therefore hold that since there is no restriction in the Constitution against the exercise
of such powers by the legislature that it was acting fully within the scope of its legislative authority in providing for appointment of post auditor
to be made as in the Act provided."
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Si'e also Riley v. State, 43 Okl. 65, 141 P. 264, to the
same effect.
There are two Utah cases, both decided before statehood and dealing with problems other than the construction of the constitutional provision involved in the present
case, which may be helpful to briefly review.
In the case of People v. Clayton, 4 Utah 421, 11 P. 206
(1886). The territorial legislature enacted a statute pursuant to the organic act of Utah which contained restrictions upon the territorial legislature, and also pursuant
to a federal statute which also imposed limitations upon
the territorial legislature. The primary issue was whether
or not the territorial statute providing for the election of
an auditor was valid inasmuch as the organic act required
the governor to appoint the state auditor. The court was
concerned with the limitations of the territorial legislature imposed by the organic act and also be section 1857
of the Revised Statutes of the United States which contained a similar limitation. Section 7 of the organic act
of the territory provided in part as follows:

". . . the governor shall nominate, and by and
with the advice and consent of the legislative council, appoint, all officers not herein otherwise provided for; ... " (Emphasis added.)
The court held that the words "not otherwise herein
provided for" created in the governor a power of appointment which could not be delegated to nor usurped by the
territorial legislature. Since neither the organic act nor
the federal statute contained a provision permitting the
legislature to provide for the election of the auditor, the
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court held that the statute so providing was void.
A similar question was raised in M cCornick rs.
Pratt, 8 Ut. 294, 30 P. 1091, (1892) decided prior to statehood. The question before the court related to the validity
of a territorial statute appropriating funds for the construction of buildings for the agricultural college and that
certain officials would be ex officio trustees of a construction committee. Focus was centered on the question of whether or not the legislative means of selooting
the trustees deprived the governor of his constitutional
power under the organic act and the Federal Statute,
to make the appointments. The same rationale was followed as in the People vs. Clayton case, supra, since the
same provisions of the organic act and the federal statute
were involved. The court held that a statute could not be
passed in contravention of the organic act which authorized the governor to make all appointments ". . . not
otherwise herein provided for." (Emphasis added.)
The Utah cases of People vs. Clayton, 4 Utah 421, 11
P. 206, (1886) and McCorriAck v. Pr.(})tt, 8 Ut. 294, 30 P.
1061 (1892) support the interpretation of the present language in Article VII, Section 10, made by this court in
State ex rel Hammond v. Maxwell, 103 Utah 1, 132 P.2d
660,663 (1942) referred to above. The comparable section
of the organic act of Utah used the word "herein." When
the Utah Constitution was adopted the word "herein' was
used in Article V, Section 1. That section provides that
no department of government shall exercisa any functions
pertaining to either of the other departments, except in
the cases "herein expressly diercted or permitted" (em-
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hasis ours). However, Article VII, Section 10 omits the
"herein" which was previously contained in the
comparable section of the organic law of Utah. This
clearly shows that the framers of the Constitution were
aware of the importance of the word "herein." They
plainly provided that each department of government
would exercise its own powers except in those situations
expressly otherwise provided within the Constitution itself. But as noted, Article VII, Section 10 of the Constitution omits the use of the word "herein." This omission
was made even though that term had been used in the
comparable provisions of the organic act of Utah and
there had been two cases construing its meaning.
The following principle of statutory construction is
applicable here :
"The omission of a word in the amendment of
a statute will be assumed to have been intentional
Where the meaning of the prior law is intended
to be continued, its terminology is also usually
continued, so that an omission of words implies
an intended change in the meaning of the statute.
Under these rules, the courts may not add a restriction found in a prior statute, but omitted
from a later one."
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 276, p. 263. See also 82

C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 384, p. 904. Yowngdale v. Burton,
102 Ft. 169, 128 P.2d 1053 (1942). It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the framers intentionally omitted the
the word "herein" from Article VII, Section 10, and in
so doing intended a different result to follow than in the
rasps of McCornick vs. Pratt, supra, and People vs.
Cla;yton, supra.
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A cardinal rule of constitutional construction is that
the words must be construed in the light of what was intended by the framers of the instrument. In the case of
State ex rel. i:. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337, (1904)
339, this court said:
" ... In construing the suprPrnP law, the
meaning of the framers must be ascertainl:'d fr 0111
the whole purview of the instrument, and, in construing a particular section, the court may refer
to any other section or provision to ascertain what
was the object, purpose, and intention of t.he Constitution makers in adopting such section. . .. "
See also University of Utah v. Board of Examiners
of Utah, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (1956).
The result reached in the early Utah cases cited by
plaintiff in his brief, llf cCornick i:. Pratt, 8 Pt. 29-1-, 30
P. 1091 (1892) and Dwncan i:. McAllister, 1 Ft. 81
(1873), referring to the comparable provision of the
Organic Act of the Utah Territory have been previously
explained.
Plaintiff also cites a number of cases from North
Carolina for the proposition that the legislature has no
authority to fill offices created by it. However, the North
Carolina provision expressly prohibited the general
assembly from appointing any officer whose office was
created by the constitution or "created by law." When
that language was later removed by constitutional Anwndment the Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that
the legislature of that state can make such appointments.
These cases are entirely consistent with defendants'
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position and argue persuasively against the strained
interpretation sought by plaintiff.

As noted previously, the people are the final repository of the powers of government. They can delegate
these rights to the Legislature through the Constitution.
The people of North Carolina determined to do it one
wav and the people of Utah determined to repose this
.'
power in the legislature rather than the governor.
If as the plaintiff contends, it was the intention of

the framers of the Utah Constitution by adopting Article
VII, Section 10, to place in the governor, "the power
to appoint all executive officers whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in the Constitution" an interpretation must be adopted that is at variance with 70 years of legislative history in this state. For
not only would such a strained construction give to the
gowrnor the right, but would require him to appoint not
only all "state officers," but also the "district officers"
as well. The rend which would result in the civil fabric of
our state would virtually be complete. All district and
state officers who have and presently are appointed or
elected pursuant to laws enacted by the legislature since
1S9G must be declared to have held, and to hold office
illegally. A degree of clairvoyance must be ascribed to
the Constitutional convention which has not heretofore
been recognized. Plaintiff in effect contends that he is
required by constitutional mandate to make every appointment to every district or state office not otherwise
set forth in the Constitution. This position approaches
the absurd. The framers of the Constitution could not
23

look into the future 70 years and detennine what
or district agencies would be needed to carry on the business of government. In their wisdom they left these decisions to future legislatures. To demonstrate in a small
way the violence which would be done to the structure
of our government if the governor were to make all appointments to district and state offices, there is listed
below ·some of the agencies of government which would
be affected. The procedure of "appointment" or "ejeeti on" provided for by law is also noted:

1

Section 8-1-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1953, establishes
procedures for election of Cemetery Maintenance
Board (L. of Ut., 1945, Ch. 17).
Section 8-4-4, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the
cemetery board with five members as designated
by the director of registration. (L. of Ut., 1955,
Ch. 11).
Section 17-6-3.1, U.C.A., 1953, creates water
and sewage districts which are governed by a
board of trustees of each district created. Provision is made for election or appointment by someone other than the governor. (L. of Ut., 1953, Ch.
29.)

Section 11-11-15, U.C.A., 1953, creates audi- ,
torium and sports arena districts, each of which
is governed by a board of directors which consist
of nine members, each appointed by someone other
than the governor. (L. of Ut., 1961, Ch. 26.)
Section 13-2-3, U.C.A., 1953, provides for the
appointment of the executive secretary of tlrn
Trade Commission, who is appointed by the Trade
Commission. (L. of Ut., 1937, Ch.19.)
Section 17-27-17, U.C.A., 1953, provides for
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the appointment of the district planning commissioner by the county commissioners. (L. of Ut.
1941, Ch. 23.)
Section 17-28-1, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the
fireman's civil service commission, the members
of which are appointed by the county commissioners. ( L. of U t., 1945, Ch. 36.)
Section 20-1-7.3, U.C.A., 1953, creates a judicial nominating commission consisting of seven
members as follows: The chief justice of the
Supreme Court, one commissioner chosen by the
senate, one commissioner chosen by the house of
representatives, two commissioners chosen by the
governor, and two commissioners chosen by the
Utah state bar association. (L. of Ut., 1967, Ch.
35.)
Section 20-1-7.6, U.C.A., 1953, provides in the
event the governor fails to appoint one of the
three persons submitted to him, within thirty
days after he has received the list containing the
names of three individuals, ". . . the chief justice
of the Supreme Court shall forthwith appoint one
of the persons named on the list to fill such office."
(L. of Ut. 1957, Ch. 35.)
Section 23-2-9, U.C.A. 1953, provides for the
appointment of the director of fish and game by
the board of fish and game. (L. of Ut., 1953, Ch.
39.)
Section 23-4-2, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the
board of big game control, comprised of five members, appointed by the governor, with the advice
and consent of the Senate as follows: The director
of the division of fish and game, a landowner
nominated by the Utah State Cattlemen's Association, a member nominated to the governor by the
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Utah State Woolgrower's Association, a member
nominated to the governor by the Utah Wildlif P
Federation, and a regional officer in Utah of tlte
U.S. Forest Service. (L. of Ut., 1953, Ch. 39.)
Section 24-2-2, U.C.A., 1953, creates the boarJ
of forestry and fire control which consists of the
board of state lands. The board of state land consists of the state superintendent of public instruction, or such other person designated by him, and
six others appointed by the governor. (L. of Ut.
1961, Ch. 53.)
Section 26-14-6, U.C.A., 1953, establishes a
board of trusttees to govern mosquito abatement
districts. The board consists of persons appointed
by district and county officials. ( L. of U t. 1923,
Ch. 90.)

1

1

!

1

Section 26-15-3, creates the office of director
of division of health, who is appointed by the
Board of Health (L. of Ut., 1953, Ch. 174.)
Section 26-16-5, U.C.A., 1953, creates the
health facilities council which is appointed by the
governor, but must be the director of public health,
the chairman of the Utah State Welfare Commission, and other designated individuals. (L. of
Ut., 1955, Ch. 40.)
Section 37-4-3, U.C.A., 1953, establishes a
state library commission composed of nine mernhers appointed by the governor with the advice
and consent of the senate. One is appointed on
recommendation of each of the following agencies:
State department of public instruction, the library
board, the legislative council and the state historical ·society. The secretary of state is designated
a member ex officio. (L. of Ut., 1957, Ch. 68.)
Section 49-1-2, U.C.A., 1953, establishes a
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board of trustees of public employees retirement
svstem composed of five members who are selected
a"s follows: one is the state auditor, two are elected and two are appointed by the governor. (L. of
Ut. 1951 (1st SS), Ch. 21.)
Section 51-1-2, U.C.A., 1953, creates the state
depository board composed of the state bank commissioner, the attorney general and a citizen appointed by the governor. (L. of Ut., 1933, Ch. 47.)
Section 53-13-1, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the
textbook commission which consists of the State
course of study commission. (A form of this statute has been effective in Utah since 1898.)
Section 53-14-1, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the
State course of study commission, which consists
of the state superintendent, deans of each state
schools of education of the University of Utah and
Utah State Agricultural College, three school superintendents to be appointed by the state board
of education and five lay citizens to be appointed
by the governor. (L. of Ut. 1907, Ch. 57.)
Section 55-10-69, U.C.A., 1953, establishes a
juvenile court commission, the membership of
which consists of the chief justice of the Supreme
Court or a justice of that court designated by the
chief justice, the chairman of the public welfare
commission, or a member of that commission designated by the chairman, the president of the
Utah State Bar, or a member of the State Bar
Commission designated by the President, the
State Superintendent of public instruction, and
the state director of public health. (L. of Ut.,
1965, Ch. 1G5.)
Section 63-5-2, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the
state council of defense, which is composed of tlie
Governor, the Secretary of State, the Attorney
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General, the President of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House, and four members appointed by the
Governor. (L. of Ut., 1941 (2nd S.S.), Ch. 33.)
Section 63-7-1, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the
Senate Committee on Interstate Cooperation which
consists of five senators designated in the same
manner as is customary in the case of the members
and chairman of other standing committees of the
senate. (L. of Ut., 1939, Ch. 130.)
Section 63-7-4-, U.C.A., 1953, establishing the
Utah commission on Interstate Co-operation is
composed of fifteen members as follows:
(1) The five members of the senate committee on interstate co-operation.
(2) The five members of the house committee
on interstate co-operation.
(3) The five members of the governor's committe on interstate co-operation.
The governor, the president of the senate and
the speaker of the house of representatives are ex
officio honorary non-voting members of the commission. The chairman of the governor's committee on interstate cooperation is the ex officio
chairman of this commission. The chairman of the
senate committee on interstate cooperation is the
ex officio first vice chairman of the commission
and the chairman of the house committee is the
ex officio ·second vice chairman of the commission.
(L. of Ut., 1939, Ch. 30.)
thr
Section 63-26-2, U.C.A., 1953,
Utah council on aging consisting of eleven members as follows : One appointed by industrial commission, one appointed by department of health,
one appointed by welfare commission, one ap-
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pointed by Superintendent of public instruction,
two appointed by the speaker of the House, two
appointed by President of the Senate, three appointed by the governor. (L. of Ut., 1961, Ch. 129.)
Section 64-6-5, U.C.A., 1953, provides for the
appointment of the superintendent of state industrial school by public welfare commission with approval of governor. (R.S., 1898 and C.L. 1907.)
Section 65-1-1.1, U.C.A., 1953, creates the
state land board whose membership is as follows:
The state superintendent of education, or such
other person designated by the state board of
education and six members appointed by the governor. (L. of Ut. 1967, Ch.176.)
Section 78-3-18, U.C.A., 1953, designates the
clerk of the Supreme Court to act as administrator
for the district courts under the court administrator's act. No provision is contained in the Act for
his appointment by the governor or other executive. (L. of Ut. 1967, Ch. 222.)
Section 73-7-11, U.C.A., 1953, authorizes irrigation districts. Each is governed by a board of
directors to be elected. (L. of Ut. 1919, Ch. 68.)
Section 73-8-20, U.C.A., 1953, authorizes
Metropolitan Water Districts, which are to be
governed by a Board of directors consisting of
representatives chosen by legislative bodies of
each city. (L. of Ut., 1935, Ch.110.)
Section 73-10-1, U.C.A., 1953, created the
Utah Water and Power Board which consisted of
thirteen members, two of whom were appointed
by the Senate and two members by the speaker of
the house. The Governor was also required to appoint seven from a list of recommendations submitted by the Utah Water User's Association.
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(The name and make-up of this Board was changed
by Chapter 176, Laws of Utah, 1967. See Section
73-10-1.5, U.C.A. 1953.)
Section 73-16-4, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the
Bear River compact commission from Utah, which
is made up of one member appointed by Interstate
stream commission of Utah and two members appointed by Utah water and power board with consent of the governor. (L. of Ut., 1955, Ch. 161.)
Section 73-18-3, U.C.A., 1953, establishes the
advisory council for administration of the state
boating act with eight members selected by the
board of parks and recreation with approval of
the governor. (L. of Ut. 1959, Ch. 124.)
This list is not exhaustive but rather illustrative
of the many state and district officers who are not appointed by the governor, but are in effect the the appointments of the legislature, an official or quasi official of
government or a private organization. As noted, provision is almos made for the election of some of these officers. It is perhaps needless to point out that the rights
of citizens have been governed and fixed by these various
officers acting on behalf of the state. A finding that
these Boards were illegally constituted would be contrary
to the stated and implied functions and powers of the
legislature over the period of its entire history and would
disrupt the procedures of government now existing and
leave uncertain the rights of many citizens whose claims
and rights have been fixed thereunder.
The majority of courts considering the question have
held that the power to appoint or nominate individuals
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tu public office can be validly delegated to private pe·r-

80ns or organizations. See 97 A.L.R. 2d 361.

With respect to the legislature exercising executive
powers, it might be observed that all the legislature does
by the provisions under study is to provide for appointments to an administrative agency with no control whatsover in the function of the agency. Nothing suggests
that the legislature will have any administrative control
or direction over the actual operations of the board. There
is a substantial distinction between merely making appointments to a board which will function independently
as an administrative agency, and a situation where the
legislature would have a week-to-week and month-tomonth control over an administrative agency.
II
THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT PRECLUDED BY ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, PROVIDING FOR THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, FROM MAKING APPOINTMENTS TO THE BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION AS REQUIRED BY 53-48-5 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

Article V must be construed in harmony with othe·r
provisions of the Constitution. It contains no express
prohibition against the appointive authority being vested
in persons other than the executive. On the other hand,
Article VII, Section 10, by its plain wording contemplates
that the Legislature shall have the power to "otherwise
provide" for a means of appointing state officers. Thus,
Article VII, Section 10, must be in the first instance construed as a limitation on the board general language of
Article V since the former is express in its provision.
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This factor is essential to a clear appreciation of the
cases cited in plaintiff's brief and for the proposition
he espouses that the appointment of officers is an executive function.

The plaintiff cites language from cases of the United
States Supreme Court for his position, however, these
cases are readily distinguishable from the case now before the court both on the facts and the applicable law. '
It is clear Congress cannot appoint officers of the United
States, because such would constitute a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine expressed in clear language
in the Constitution of the United States. Article II, Sec.
tion 2 provides :
". . . and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: . . .'' (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the express language of the U.S. Constitution
allows Congress to appoint officers only where the Constitution "herein" otherwise providd. That language is
not found in Article VII, Section 10, of the Utah Constitution, although it was in the Organic Act, People v. Clayton, 4 Ut. 421, 11 P. 206 (1886), and was not carriPd owr
into the Constitution it must be concluded that the Utah
Constitution was not intended to limit the appointment
power to the Governor either expressly, or on the basis
of the implications in the concept of separation of powers.
The plaintiff also relies upon a number of decisions
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from other states to support his separation of powers
contention. The Constitutions of Indiana and Massachusetts do not contain the same permissive language as the
Utah Constitution, and therefore the cited cases do not
pertain to the necessary question of Constitutional construction before the Court. Even so, in In re Opinion
of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939), cited
in plaintiff's brief at page 30, the Court refused to say
the executive nature of the power to appoint and remove
placed such power exclusively with the Governor. These
cases obviously involved Constitutional provision not
similar to Article VII, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution.
Equally inapplicable are the provisions of the Constitutions of Kansas, Arkansas, and Missouri. Appellants'
reliance upon the cases cited from those jurisdictions is
misplaced and are not applicable to the case now before
the court. The Colorado Supreme Court has apparently
rejected, in an analogous case, the position of the Nebraska and Missouri courts in the cases cited in Appellants' Brief. People ex rel TValker v. Capp, 61 Colo. 396,
158 P. 1-13 (1916). As noted previously states with near
identical provisions to Article VII, Section 10 have not
r·.onstrued their Constitutions in the same narrow fashion
plaintiff urges this Court follow. 2
The ultimate issue in this case must be viewed in
the light of U,tah's Constitution and decisions considering
Artic!P Y. No decision of the Utah Court has passed on
1

1

This case is discussed at page 16 of this Brief.
See pages ·--- through ... ., supra.

2
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the relationship between Article VII Section lO and
Article V.
At the outset, it is well to note what has been the
traditional evaluation of the concept of separation of
powers. Madison in The Federalist, No. XLVII, Vol. 1,
at 331 (1916) stated with reference to Montesquieu's concept of separation of power, which was at the base of
the framework of the American Constitution and of many
State constitutions:
""" • • he [Montesquieu] did not mean that
these departments ought to have no PARTIAL
AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of
each other. His meaning, as his own words import,
and still more conclusively as illustrated by the
example of his eye, can amount to no more than
this, that where the WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. • • """
The Utah Supreme Court has in the past accepted the
Montesquieu conceptualization of separation of powers
when speaking of the provisions of Article V, Section 1
of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Tite v. State
T<tx Comm., 89 Ut. 404, 57 P.2d 734 (1936). The action of
the legislation in this case hardly constitutes a usurption
of the whole of the executive power, nor does it in any
way constitute a major intrusion into the executive power
when the constitutional provision of Article VII, Section
10 is viewed in conjunction with the intent of Article
V. Although in the case of Springer v. Philippine Islrunds,
277 U.S. 189 (1928) Madison's writings in The Federalist
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1

\\'ere qnoted with reference to the appointment power,
it should be rememberd that Madison was not discussing
the concept of separation of powers in general but was
justifying the divisions of labor set forth in the proposed
Constitution of the United States in an effort to obtain its
adoption by the colonies. Consequently, the question of
whetht'r the present legislation violates Article V, must
be examined exclusively from the standpoint of the
separation of powers doctrine of the Utah Constitution
in conjunction with Article VII, Section 10. The last sentence of Section 1 of Artcle V provides :
" ... no person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining
to either of the others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted." (emphasis added.)
Thus, the Constitution in Article VII, Section 10 expressly
permits the legislature to provide for other means of
appointment and necessarily exempts that action from
the application of Artcile V. The court is not concerned
with the wisdom of the legislation, and has no power
to a arrest execution of the statutes, however unwise or
unjust they may appear. Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19
lTt. 368, 57 P.l. 45 L.R.A. 628 (1899), Breeden v. Lewis, 26
Lit. 120, 72 P. 388 (1903). Nothing in the case of Lee v.
the State, 13 U.2d 15, 367 P.2d 861 (1962) is inconsisten
with the authority of the present statute authorizing the
legislature to make an appointment to the single hoard.
That case dealt exclusively with the question of whether a
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constitutional amendment was properly adopted, and 1
whether the ballot set out one or more possible constitu.
tional amendments. A cursory reading of that case demon.
strates that it, in no way, involves the question of the
constitutionality of the exercise of the appointive author.
ity by the legislature, nor does it discuss the concept of the
separation of powers. In fact, nowhere in the case is Article 5 even mentioned. The very reference to the case of
Lee v. State, supra, indicates the difficulty of the position
of the plaintiff, since he is required to torture cases to
find any authority to support his proposition. In Tite v.
State Tax Commission, 89 Ut. 404, 57 P.2d (1936), Justice
Wolf writing for the Utah Supreme Court made it clear
that Article 5 of the Utah 1Constitution does not totally ,
prohibit one department of government from exercising I
functions that may be comparable to functions exercised
by another department of government. The court indicated that there was no prohibition against the State Ta.x
Commission determining whether there had been a violation of law and imposing a penalty.
It did indicate
that where the exercise of the function was the exercise
of judicial discretion, such as imposing an indeterminate
fine, that Article 5 would be violated, but the court did
not expressly note that the separation of powers concept
does tolerate reasonable overlapping. The court observed:
"The absolute independence of the three
branches of government which was advocated by
Montesquieu has not been found entirely practicable, and, although the threefold division of powers
is the basis of the American Constitution, there
are many cases in which the duties of one depart-
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ment are to a certain extent devolved upon and
shared by the other."

Asimilar conclusion is noted in Vanderbilt, The Doctrine

of the Separation of Powers and Its Present-Day Significance, Conant 1953, where Justice Vanderbilt acknowl-

edged:

"The doctrine of the separation of governmental powers is not a mere theoretical, philosophical concept. It is a practical, workaday principle. The division of government into three
branches does not imply, as its critics would have
us think, three watertight compartments .. Montesquieu, as we have seen, knew better. the three
departments, he said, must move 'in concert.'"

Clearly, therefore, with the Utah Supreme Court
having acknowledged the general concept that there is
permissible overlapping between the various departments
of government, and Article V expressly excepting from
its scope activities where the Constitution provides for
the function of one department of government that may
necessarily involve a portion of the activity of another,
and with Article VII Section 10 expressly so authorizing,
it must be concluded that the present legislation does not
unreasonably infringe on the concept of separation of
powers. The Colorado and Idaho cases, supra, discuss and
uphold the constitutionality of statutes exercising the
legislative appointive powers in the face of charges that
the separtion of powers doctrine was violated. Historically the founders of the various states were often suspicious of strong executive power and placed numerous
limitations on the authority of the executive to act. These
limitations were imposed in many instances in spite of a
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belief in the concept of separation of power. The Constit.
uents of Georgia and Illinois are illustrative of some of
the limitations imposed on the executive. Both ConstitHtions required that the legislature elect the governor.
Georgia Constitution, 1789, Article II, Section 1 and 2.
Illinois Constitution 1818, Article III, Section 2. This
obviously illustrated the
in the concept of
separation of powers and is indicative of how Article yI
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution should be construe<l
in this instance in order to retain the intended flexibility.
It is further noteworthy that the District Court in this
instance expressly found that Article V, of the Utah Constitution was not violated finding that historical practice
in this state has sanctioned legislation similar to that
now before the court. (R. 147, 141)
III

THE PROVISIONS OF 53-48-5 UT AH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, SECTION 24
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UT AH, NOR THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES.

The plaintiff's final argument is that Section 5(1)
of Senate Bill 10, 53-48-5 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
violates Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah,
because it is not uniform in its operation. A further claim 1
is asserted that the provision also violates the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution. Article I, Sec·
tion 24 has been held by this court to embrace generally
the same provisions as the equal protection clause of the '
United States Constitution prohibiting unequal classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Ut. 501, 78 P.2d 920 ( 1938). Es
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both constitutional provisions contemplate that
diffrrences in application of legislation should not be arbitrarily based. However, it should be remembered that in
!llaking such a determination it is presumed that the legislation is constitutional, and a court will not declare an act
unconstitutional if there is any conceivable basis for
distinction. Further, broad latitudes will he allowed a
legislature in establishing classifications.
At the outset it is submitted that the plaintiff is
'"ithout cause to complain. He is not a member of the
class against whom any discrimination, if there be any,
is directed. He is an appointing authority, not an appointee. He is not affected personally by the application
of the statute. Consequently it is submitted that he is
without basis to challenge the constitutionality of the instant legislation.
Even assuming the status of the plaintiff to maintain
a claim of denial of equal protection of uniform operation, it is submitted that the claim is specious at best.
The obvious purpose of the legislation is to permit the
legislature to have a modest degree of participation in
the establishment of the agency charged with administering higher education in this state. This is a legitimate
purpose, and not a discriminatory one. This being so,
the Courts accord to the Legislaturt> substantial latitude
in determining how its policies should be implemented.
Equal Protection, Harv. L. R. 1065, 1072-1078 (1969).
Because there is a need for legislative input as respects
the question of higher education in the State of Utah, the
LPgislature can reasonably determine the manner in
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which that input is to be obtained. A control on the '
gubernatorial appointment is afforded in the traditional
sense. Consent of the Senate must be obtained. Legi- i
slative input is obtained as respects the appointments
1
of the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate by according each of these officers the appointment prerogative. The only way the legislature could
properly obtain a legislative check over the governor 1
would be by making his appointments subject to legisla- 1
tive control. Legislative check on the other appointees is,
of course, afforded by the very fact that officers of the
legislature make the appointment.

It is significant that plaintiff cites the case of Baker ,
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), for the position that there
is a denial of equal protection and uniform operation in
the instant case. Subsequent cases have clearly indicated
that where the nature of the agency was essentially administrative, such as for the purposes of carrying out :
educational policy, reasonable disparities in the appoint- 1
ment prooess could be tolerated. In Sailors v. The Board
of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), a local school board
was elected for each of several school districts which
were unequal in population. The members of each local
board selected one member to a biennial meeting at which
the five member county board was elected. Suit was
brought challenging the county board on the ground
that it had violated the one man, one vote principle laid
down in Baker v. Carr, supra. The United States Supreme
Court rejected that contention holding that the functions of the county board were chiefly administrative
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rather than legislative, and that therefore the members
such a unit could be appointed by delegates from districts not equal in population. By analogy, therefore,
since the action in this case is equally appointive, the
principle of Baker v. Carr, supra, is not applicable, and
the mere fact that one may be treated slightly different
than another so far as legislative confirmation is concerned would not render the statute unconstitutional.
POINT IV.
THE COURTS HAVE A DUTY TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT UNLESS IT CLEARLY VIOLATES A PROVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

A statute must be held constitutional unless it
clearly violates a provision of the Constitution. Every
doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute must be resolved in favor of its validity. A court has a duty to
uphold legislative acts unless it is convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that they are unconstitutional. This
principle has been enumerated by a long line of Utah
decisions. Great Salt .Authority v. Island Ranch Co., 18
U.2d 45, -1-14 P.2d 963 (1966), Wood v. Budge, 13 U.2d 359,
374 P.2d 516 (1962); State v. Geurts, 11 U. 2d 345, 359
P.2d 12 (1961); Parkinson v. Watson, 4 U.2d 191, 291
P.2d 400 (1955); State Board of Examiners v. Commission of Finance, 122 Ut. 164, 247 P.2d 435 (1952); Newcomb v. Ogde n City, et al., 121 Ut. 503, 243 P.2d (19'52)
941; Snow v. K eddington, 113 Ut. 325, 195 P.2d 234
(1948); Broa.dbent v. Gibson, 105 Ut. 53, 140 P.2d 939
(1943); Keetch v. Cordner, 90 Ut. 423, 62 P.2d 273 (1936);
State v Mason, 94 U. 501, 178 P.2d 920 (1938), 16 Am. Jur.,
Constitutional Law, sec. 137, p. 336.
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In University of Utah 1'S. Board of Examiners ur
State of Ctah, -1: LT.2d ±08, 295 P.2d 3±8,
( l!JGG), th(·
court relied upon the general principle of :statutory construction as follows :

"In 16 C.J.S., Title Constitutional Law 34
page 74, it is said:
' '
" 'Long acquiescence by the people in legislative or judicial construction of constitutional
provisions is entitled to great weight with the
courts.' "
The crucial language contained in Article Yll, :-;ection 10, was given interpretation by the courts prior to '
statehood and a discriminating use of that language was
employed in our present Constitution. These factors are
entitled to a great weight in favor of a constitutional
interpretation of the legislation in this case.
In Skeen v. Pain, 32 Ut. 295, 90 P. ±40, -1-12 (1907),
the constitutionality of a statute was drawn into question
because it authorized an ouster action to be maintained
by an individual, whereas Article VIII, Section 18 of the
Constitution indicates that all prosecutions are to be
made in the name of the state. The court in upholding
the statute observed:
"To say the least, the question is not free
from doubt and, being so, all doubts must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the
statute."
We submit that a fair reading of the constitutional
provision in the light of its background and decided
cases leaves no doubt concerning the constitutionality
of the Section 5 ( 1) of Senate Bill 10. And, even if the
court should find that a shadow of doubt has been ca:lt
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across the face of this statute, "all doubts must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality ... "
rrhe prayer of the complaint seeks a restraining order enjoining defendants from appointing any members
to the Board of Higher Education and requesting the
court to declare that plaintiff has the exclusive power,
subject to the consent of the senate, to appoint all members of the Board.
Certainly, if the provision in question is unconstitutional, the court may not rewrite the section to provide
that the Governor shall make all 15 appointments, and
thus preserve the constitutionality of the legislation. The
law is clear that an unconstitutional act or provision will
not be rewritten so as to make it constitutional.
It must then follow that since the composition of the

board is such an integral part of the Act, the entire Act
must fail and could not be saved by a severability clause.
If the court could sever that provision permitting the
Speaker and the President to make appointments, then
the Act as severed and preserved would only provide for
the nine appointments of the Governor, and the other provisions of the Act relating to membership would seem to
permit the Governor to appoint eight Democrats and one
Rep11blican, and the other six appointments simply
would not be made. This would be absurd and would
frustrate the rather clear overall legislative intent. It
thus seems that the act in its entirety must be constitutional or the entire act must fail, because the provisions relating to membership appear to be at the very
heart of the subject legislation.
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CONCLUSION
All political power is declared by Article I, Section
2, of the Utah Constitution, to be inherent in the people,
It is they who have delegated the appointive power to
the legislature of the state, except as stated in the constitution.
The people through Article VII, Section 10, chose
to repose the appointive power with their elected representatives in the House of Representatives and the Senate, rather than with the Governor, apparently in the belief that the judgment of many is superior to the judgment of one.
As noted in the foregoing cases, decided by the Supreme Courts of Idaho and Colorado, the exercise of the
appointive power of the people by the ligislature does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine. Even the
famous proponents of our system of government realized
that practical application would result in some overlapping of functions in the administration of government
This Court has recognized thi'S,.
The language of Article VII, Section 10, adopted hy
the Constitutional Convention of Utah was changed from
that contained in the Organic Act which had been interpreted as preventing legislative appointments. The
exact language of the Colorado provision was employed,
which had been held by the Supreme Court of that state
as permitting the legislature to designate officers to fill
offices created by law. Further, this Court has stated by
way of dicta that the provision " ... if not otherwise
provided for" referred to the legislative act creating the
office. The Supreme Courts of Idaho, Montana and Colo-
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rado have all so interpreted the same language contained
in the comparable sections of the constitutions of those
states, in the same way. Additionally, a grammatical
reading of the section leads to the same result. But perhaps the most persuasive argument favoring a constitutional construction of this provision is the fact that state
legislatures for 70 years have impliedly relied upon such
an interpretation and have passed a great many statutes,
beginning with the first legislature in 1898, in which the
election or appointment of state and district officers
must be as "otherwise provided for by law".
Plaintiff is without standing to claim that he is
denied the equal protection of the law under Senate
Bill 10, and even if such standing were present, the doctrine is not applicable in this case.
Every doubt, if any there be, should be resolved
in favor of a constitutional construction of Senate Bill
10. The court has a duty to uphold the act unless it is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional.
We submit that section 5(1) of Senate Bill 10 is
valid in every respect, and should be declared constitutional by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
REX J. HANSON and
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants
Respondents.
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copies of the within and foregoing Brief was served upon the plaintiffs and appellants by mailing, postage pr(}
paid, the said copies to their attorney, Sidney G. Baucom,
Special Assistant Attorney Gneral, 1407 West North
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84116, this
day of
November, 1969.

46

